Heidegger’s Personal Ontochronology
Our translation strategy for Heidegger’s work is guided by a commitment to clarity, making his complex lexicon accessible without sacrificing its philosophical depth. We approach his unique terminology with a methodology that values transparency, even when this requires moving beyond a strictly literal rendition. Heidegger often creates new compound words or breaks apart familiar ones to uncover their original, etymological power. In English, we represent this technique by using analytical paraphrases or hyphenated loan-translations that reveal the word’s inner structure. This is why Zuhandenheit becomes “readiness-to-hand” and Vorhandenheit becomes “presence-at-hand.”
For his most debated terms, we use consistent, minimally interpretive translations. Fundamental concepts like Dasein are left in German to avoid narrowing their meaning, while Sorge is rendered simply as “care.” The Greek term Aletheia is translated as “unconcealment,” reserving the word “truth” for contexts dealing with logical propositions. We carefully signal the role of key German prefixes—such as Ent-, Vor-, or Zu—through hyphens or phrasing, turning Ent-fernung into “de-distancing” and Vorhabe into “fore-having.” Capitalization is also employed strategically to mark philosophical concepts; “Being” (Sein) is distinguished from “beings” (Seiendes), while the ordinary verb “being” remains in lower case.
Zuhandenheit → “readiness-to-hand”
Vorhandenheit → “presence-at-hand”
Erschlossenheit → “disclosedness”
Seinsfrage → “the question of Being”
The German language allows for dense, complex sentence structures that are unnatural in English. We therefore restructure syntax to preserve the logical flow of ideas without replicating unnecessary difficulty. Long, intricate sentences are broken into more manageable units, though we carefully maintain the original order of clauses where it carries philosophical weight. We clarify ambiguous pronouns, fill in omitted words, and make contextual references explicit whenever needed for understanding.
Heidegger’s use of hyphens and spacing to flag philosophical operations—as in Sein-lassen or Da-sein—is mirrored in English with similar typographical devices. Technical terms from Greek and Latin, such as logos or physis, are retained where they function as established concepts and are glossed on first use. We also strive to reflect the evolution in Heidegger’s style, preserving the scholarly tone of his early work and the more poetic diction of his later writings. We mirror Heidegger's own stylistic choices to the extent possible in English:
His hyphenated or spaced-out terms (Sein-lassen, Da-sein) are mirrored with similar devices in English.
Technical terms from Greek and Latin (like logos or physis) are kept but explained on their first occurrence.
The formal, scholarly tone of his early work and the more poetic style of his later work are both preserved.
Our overall lexical policy employs literalism where it aids conceptual clarity, but we adopt more idiomatic phrasing where a direct translation would distort the argument. Thus, Weltbild is rendered as “world-picture” and Gestell as “enframing.” A term like Ereignis is translated as “appropriation” only when its connection to owning (eignen) is central; otherwise, it is kept in German to remain neutral in ongoing scholarly debates. Compound nouns are often decomposed into more analytic English forms, such as “analytic of Dasein” for Daseinsanalytik, to make their grammatical relationships clear. In essence, where German compounding compresses argument into morphology, English unpacks that compression into overt relational syntax, ensuring that operations like grounding, disclosure, or withdrawal remain inferentially visible. The net effect is an English translation that is philologically accountable, terminologically stable, and discursively legible. It allows non-specialists to engage with Heidegger’s ontology without forfeiting the semantic tensions that drive his thought. This accessibility is achieved without resorting to a paraphrase that would erase the very phenomena his distinctive diction seeks to disclose.
We track words with multiple meanings, using a core translation but noting when Heidegger intentionally plays on a term’s secondary definitions. Puns and wordplay are recreated in English only when they are philosophically significant; otherwise, we prioritize the central meaning over stylistic flair.
His hyphenated or spaced-out terms (Sein-lassen, Da-sein) are mirrored with similar devices in English.
Technical terms from Greek and Latin (like logos or physis) are kept but explained on their first occurrence.
The formal, scholarly tone of his early work and the more poetic style of his later work are both preserved.
Where Heidegger’s German compresses philosophical argument into the structure of a single word, our English translation carefully unpacks it into clear, relational syntax. The result is a text that is both faithful to the original and genuinely readable, allowing newcomers to navigate Heidegger’s ontology without losing the vital tensions that propel his thinking. This approach aims to provide accessibility without ever reducing his work to a mere paraphrase that would erase the very phenomena he sought to reveal.
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Under 17 U.S.C. § 304, Heidegger's pre-1924 works are public domain in the US. Works published before 1924 are definitively in the public domain under Title 17, Section 305 of the U.S. Code. Because U.S. copyright for foreign works first published between 1923 and 1977 lasts a fixed 95 years from first publication (17 U.S.C. §304) and terms run to the end of the calendar year (17 U.S.C. §305), any Heidegger original German work first published before 1929 (i.e., 1928 or earlier) has completed its term and is in the U.S. public domain by January 1, 2025.
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1912 The Realities Problem in Modern Philosophy
This early essay was first published in the Catholic journal, "Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görresgesellschaft", in 1912, and subsequently reprinted several times after that.
Beneath the seemingly straightforward question of realism in modern philosophy lurked a more fundamental problem that Heidegger's 1912 analysis would excavate with surgical precision. Through careful dismantling of contemporary philosophical frameworks, he revealed how the very notion of "reality" had become entangled in presuppositions that obscured rather than illuminated the fundamental question of Being. Not content with merely cataloging different philosophical positions on realism, Heidegger's investigation cut to the heart of how modern philosophy had inherited and transformed ancient questions about the nature of reality.
This work is critical to understand his initial approach to Ontochronology, leading to his advanced theories on the Phenomenology of Time in his major work "Being and Time". Heidegger argues here that time in the historical sciences is not a homogeneous, mathematical series as it is in physics, but rather a qualitative, context-dependent concept. He emphasizes the importance of understanding time in relation to the specific aims and methodologies of historical science, and posits that time in history has a unique meaning and function, deeply bound up with the cultural and human context of historical events. This approach reflects a broader philosophical inquiry into the nature of being and temporality that Heidegger would develop in his later works. Metaphysics has triumphed over Rationalism and Empiricism as the only field that is vectored towards "the only question that matters".
From the dominant neo-Kantian frameworks of his time emerged a peculiar blindness that Heidegger's analysis would expose - their preoccupation with epistemological questions had led modern philosophers to miss the more fundamental ontological issues at stake in the problem of reality. Within their elaborate systems of knowledge and representation lay buried assumptions about Being that demanded excavation. Rather than accepting the terms of debate between realists and idealists, Heidegger's work pushed toward a more radical questioning that would reveal how both positions rested on unexamined metaphysical foundations. Through close examination of how different philosophical schools approached the question of reality, his analysis revealed the limitations of both empiricist and rationalist approaches to understanding the relationship between mind and world.
Deep within the modern philosophical project's attempt to secure objective knowledge lay what Heidegger identified as a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of truth and Being. His investigation showed how contemporary debates about realism had lost touch with the original Greek understanding of truth as aletheia or unconcealment. In place of this more primordial understanding, modern philosophy had substituted various theories of correspondence or coherence that, while sophisticated, failed to address the fundamental question of how beings become accessible to human understanding in the first place. By tracing how this transformation in the understanding of truth and reality had occurred, Heidegger's analysis opened the way for a more fundamental questioning of the relationship between human existence and the manifestation of Being - a questioning that would come to dominate his later philosophical work.
1912 Recent Research on Logic
Heidegger's paper "Recent Research on Logic" examines the development of scientific logic since the early 20th century, challenging the traditional view of logic as a fixed set of forms and rules. It emphasizes the shift from psychologism (the emphasis on psychological principles in logic) to a more transcendental approach, highlighting the work of philosophers such as Husserl and Bolzano in this transition. The paper discusses the nature of logic, its relation to psychology, and the implications of these changes for understanding concepts, judgment, and the theory of categories. It considers the distinction between mental acts and logical content, and argues for the intrinsic value of logic apart from the empirical disciplines. The paper also touches on object theory, judgement theory, and the interplay between logic and mathematics, underlining the continuing development and complexity of logical principles and their application in different fields of study. Heidegger's analysis of contemporary logic shatters conventional interpretations by exposing the hidden ontological assumptions undergirding logical systems. His 1912 examination strips away the technical facades of recent developments in logic to reveal how formalization itself emerges from unexamined presuppositions about Being and truth. Through rigorous engagement with developments in mathematical logic, he demonstrates how the drive toward complete formalization obscures more fundamental questions about the relationship between thought and Being. Not content to merely survey the field, his investigation excavates the metaphysical foundations that both enable and limit modern logical systems.
Beneath the surface of debates about logical form and validity, Heidegger uncovers a more profound crisis in the understanding of truth itself. His analysis reveals how contemporary logic's preoccupation with formal structures and symbolic manipulation represents both an advancement and a retreat - while achieving unprecedented precision in certain domains, modern logical systems simultaneously withdraw from engaging with more fundamental questions about the nature of truth and meaning. Through examination of how different logical frameworks approach the relationship between language and reality, his work exposes the limitations of purely formal approaches to understanding human thought. The development of symbolic logic, he argues, marks not just a technical achievement but a transformation in how we conceive the relationship between mind and world.
The drive toward complete formalization, while powerful within its domain, ultimately fails to address how logical structures themselves emerge from more primordial relationships between human understanding and Being. This critique anticipates his later more explicit rejection of logical positivism and points toward his development of a more fundamental questioning of the relationship between thought, language, and Being.
1913 The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism: A Critical-Positive Contribution to Logic
Here Heidegger defends metaphysics. He argues that transcendental logic can't be dismissed by rationalism, as this would destroy its own foundation and paralyze judgment and cognition. This work is a comprehensive exploration of the intersection between psychology and logic, focusing on the concept of judgment in the context of psychologism. It begins with a preface acknowledging influences and inspirations, followed by an introduction discussing the impact of psychological research on various fields, including logic. The paper challenges the psychological interpretation of logic and argues for a transcendental-logical view. The main body of the paper is divided into several sections, each examining different aspects and theories related to judgment in the context of psychologism. It includes critical assessments of the theories of notable philosophers such as Wilhelm Wundt and Heinrich Maier, analyzing their approaches to judgment, its structure, and its various forms. Within contemporary debates about the foundations of logic, Heidegger detected a profound confusion about the relationship between psychological acts and logical content. His analysis demonstrated how attempts to reduce logical laws to psychological regularities inevitably led to self-contradiction. By tracing the emergence of psychologistic theories from Cartesian assumptions about consciousness, he proved how such approaches necessarily failed to grasp the essential nature of logical truth. The question of judgment, he argued, could not be resolved through empirical investigation of mental processes but required a more fundamental inquiry into the nature of truth itself.
Against psychologism's reduction of logical validity to mental operations, Heidegger advanced a radical reinterpretation of the relationship between thought and Being. His work exposed how psychologistic theories, in their attempt to ground logic in psychology, missed the fundamental difference between the act of judgment and its logical content. This distinction, he argued, pointed toward a more primordial understanding of truth that transcended both psychological and purely formal approaches. By demonstrating the inadequacy of psychologistic explanations, Heidegger cleared the ground for what would later become his more explicit engagement with fundamental ontology. His critique suggested that neither psychological investigation nor formal logic alone could adequately address the question of how truth becomes accessible to human understanding.
1913 Review of "A Selection of Kant's letters"
This is Heidegger’s commentary on the publication “Kant-Laienbrevier. A presentation of Kant's view of the world and life for the unlearned educated person from Kant's writings, letters and oral statements, which was Compiled by F. Groß. Heidegger wrote these comments in 1913/14 and later published them with a forward, which is included here. Heidegger's engagement with Kant's correspondence pointed toward a more nuanced understanding of how the critical philosophy emerged from concrete intellectual struggles rather than abstract speculation alone. The letters showed Kant wrestling with fundamental questions about the possibility of metaphysical knowledge while simultaneously managing mundane academic obligations and personal relationships. This tension between the philosophical and the personal illuminated what Heidegger saw as a crucial aspect of Kant's thought - its grounding in finite human existence rather than abstract rationality. Through this lens, the letters transcended mere biographical interest to become crucial documents for understanding the development and limitations of Kant's critical project. This interpretation anticipated Heidegger's later, more radical reading of Kant as a thinker who unknowingly pointed toward the temporal foundations of human understanding.
1915 Duns Scotus' Doctrine of Categories and Meaning
Martin Heidegger's dissertation on Duns Scotus, entitled "Duns Scotus' Doctrine of Categories and Meaning" (original German: "Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus"), was originally submitted as a doctoral dissertation in 1915. Heidegger analyses Scotus's doctrine of categories and provides a detailed explanation of the Grammatica Speculativa, a work of medieval grammar now known to have been written by Thomas of Erfurt. This work is significant because it represents an early foray into Heidegger's lifelong philosophical concerns, particularly the question of being in the guise of the problem of categories and the question of language in the guise of the doctrine of meaning.
Heidegger adopts a historical-philosophical approach, meticulously analysing and interpreting Duns Scotus' theories in the context of both medieval scholasticism and modern philosophical thought. He stresses the need to go beyond a purely historical analysis and to engage with the systematic philosophical content inherent in Scotus' work. Here Heidegger places a strong emphasis on categorisation, not just as an intellectual exercise, but as a critical tool for understanding the structure of reality and knowledge. The analysis delves into the nuances of Scotus' categories, exploring their implications for the conceptualisation of reality and the formation of meaning. This exploration is grounded in a clear understanding of the historical development of these ideas, providing a rich context for their appreciation and critique.
His analysis disrupts standard interpretations of Scotist thought by positioning the medieval logician's work not merely as scholastic speculation but as a crucial development in theories of signification. The text moves through dense layers of medieval logical theory to uncover insights that anticipate modern phenomenological approaches to meaning.
Within Scotus' treatment of categories, Heidegger detected sophisticated insights into the relationship between language, thought, and reality that transcended conventional scholastic frameworks. His reading demonstrates how Scotist theories of univocity and formal distinction pointed toward more nuanced understandings of how meaning functions in different domains of discourse. Yet this interpretation also highlights significant tensions in Scotus' attempt to reconcile Aristotelian categories with medieval theological demands. The analysis uncovers problematic assumptions in how Scotus conceived the relationship between logical categories and metaphysical reality - assumptions that would later influence the development of modern philosophical logic.
The philosophical significance of Heidegger's reading strikes at fundamental questions about the nature of meaning and categorization. His analysis suggests that Scotus' logical works harbored insights about the relationship between language and reality that later scholastic and modern philosophy failed to adequately appreciate. However, the text struggles with methodological problems in its attempt to bridge medieval and modern philosophical frameworks. These difficulties point toward broader issues in how contemporary philosophy engages with medieval thought - issues that would shape Heidegger's later critiques of Western metaphysics. The work thus occupies an ambiguous position between historical scholarship and philosophical appropriation, never fully resolving tensions between these competing demands.
1916 The Concept of Time in the Study of History
Heidegger contrasts this with the use of time in the natural sciences, especially physics. The paper begins with general remarks on science and the theory of science, then moves into a detailed examination of the role and structure of the concept of time in historical research. It is argued that time in history has a qualitative, unique character that differs from its quantitative and homogeneous character in physics. The paper also discusses the methodological aspects of historical science and the importance of time in understanding and categorizing historical events, emphasizing the distinct nature of historical time. The investigation targets crucial limitations in how historical scholarship treats time as a neutral medium for arranging past events. Heidegger's critique demonstrates that standard historiographical methods rest on problematic assumptions about the nature of temporal experience inherited from natural science. By reducing historical time to measurable chronological sequence, these approaches miss how temporal understanding emerges from more fundamental structures of human existence. Yet this criticism itself raises methodological difficulties about how historical research might proceed without presupposing objective chronological frameworks. The text oscillates between penetrating critique and ambiguous gestures toward alternative conceptions of historical time.
The philosophical stakes of Heidegger's analysis strike at the foundations of historical methodology itself. His work suggests that conventional approaches to historical time fail to grasp how temporal understanding shapes both the object and method of historical research. This insight carries profound implications for the possibility of historical knowledge, pointing toward fundamental problems in how scholarship conceives its relationship to past events. The text thus opens crucial questions about the nature of historical understanding while struggling to articulate viable alternatives to standard chronological frameworks. These theoretical tensions would persist in Heidegger's later work on temporality and historical existence, suggesting deep-seated problems in any attempt to think historical time outside conventional metaphysical patterns.